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This thesis assesses the need for U.S.-Russian cooperation in Central Asia to 
create a stronger, more reliable long-term stability in the region.  Current United States 
policy toward Russia in Central Asia is tailored to isolate and minimize Russian influence 
due, in great part to a perception that Russian heavy-handedness is restricting political 
and economic development in Central Asia.  Reforming Central Asia to be less dependent 
on Russia has been a centerpiece of U.S. policy in the region. 
This thesis provides U.S. foreign policy makers with an alternative view on 
Russia.  This view supports a new policy that encourages a more sustainable multi-lateral 
approach to stability in the region and more accurately takes into account the real threats 
to the region.  An isolated Russia in Central Asia will complicate U.S. policy in the 
region and provide opportunities for other regional players antagonistic to a U.S. 
presence. 
The lack of well established nation states in Central Asia, the judgment that 
Russias approach is cooperative, and a clear understanding of the intentions of other 
regional players bring this thesis to the conclusion that improved U.S.-Russian 
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This thesis assesses the need for U.S.-Russian cooperation in Central Asia to 
create a stronger, more reliable long-term stability in the region.  Current United States 
policy toward Russia in Central Asia is tailored to isolate and minimize Russian influence 
due, in great part to a perception that Russian heavy-handedness is restricting political 
and economic development in Central Asia.  Reforming Central Asia to be less dependent 
on Russia has been a centerpiece of U.S. policy as recently as the fiscal year 2001 foreign 
policy funding debate.1 
This thesis provides U.S. foreign policy makers with an alternative view on 
Russia.  This view supports a new policy that encourages a more sustainable multi-lateral 
approach to stability in the region and more accurately assesses the real threats to the 
region. 
Chapter II demonstrates that Central Asias history does not provide a basis for 
the five separate nation-states, as they exist today.  In Central Asia, the nation-state did 
not exist before or after Russian colonialism reached the region in the 18th century. 
This examination of Central Asias history and present struggles with building 
democracy portray a region unprepared to develop and implement independent foreign 
policies in the international arena.  Weak nation-states have little option but to look 
toward other powers for protection.  Stephen M. Walt points out that as nations become 
weaker and their alternatives lessen, they are more likely to enter an alliance of necessity 
                                                 
1  Chapter III addresses this issue in more detail the reference is from the 
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001, U.S. 
Department of State, March 15, 2000 
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rather than desire.  Walt states, If weak states see no possibility of outside 
assistancethey may be forced to accommodate the most imminent threat.2 
Chapter III defines Russia as the dominant power in Central Asia.  Up until 1991 
and the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia enjoyed its position as the strongest player in the 
region.  Through political, economic and military dominance, Russia was able to sustain 
Central Asian dependence.   
However, today Russias economic collapse, growing isolation from the Western 
economies, and loss of superpower status have dramatically reduced Russian influence in 
Central Asia and, most importantly the necessity for Central Asian countries to depend on 
Russia for security as well as political and economic stability.    
While the requirements have been lessened, Central Asias needs to retain, strong 
political and economic ties with Russia continue.  Russia and other countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States are Central Asias largest economic partners.  The 
dramatic economic challenges of the region have reduced Western investment and, while 
Chinese investment continues to rise, it remains a small fraction of the economic 
relationship with Russia. 
Chapter III reveals that much of Russias actions in Central Asia are indeed heavy 
handed.  However, Russia has generally responded to the efforts of other powers to 
establish standards of appropriate behavior, has worked within the new institutional 
                                                 
2 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances,(Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 
New Jersey, 1990) 30. 
 xiii
arrangements, like the OSCE in Europe, and has internalized many of the new norms of 
international community.3 
Chapter IV analyzes the other regional players in Central Asia.  It points out that 
the other regional players as part of this great game have influence on regional stability 
than Russia.  It provides a background of the major characteristics of the region from 
which to redirect failing U.S. antagonistic policies of the past.   
Today the region is no different, as Central Asias neighbor-- China, Iran, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey-- are vying for increasing influence in the region.  This 
chapter explores the role each country has in Central Asia by analyzing the positive and 
negative effects of each country. This analysis reaches the following conclusions: 
• At some level, Central Asia must address the fundamentalist Islamic threat as real.  
The Pakistani and Afghani roles in perpetuating the Islamic threat are very evident. 
• Turkeys limited near-term economic potential significantly reduces its ability to 
promote greater economic growth in Central Asia. 
• Iran is too isolated from the international community to provide any meaningful 
advantage for increased multi-lateral cooperation. 
• Chinese intentions are questionable and potentially destabilizing. 
 
Chapter IV further establishes that if a new great game is afoot in Central Asia, 
the options for stability other than through Russias involvement are negligible.  The 
competition between Turkey and Iran to define a historical purpose for their presence is 
constrained by the small political and economic potential each has in the region.  With 
economics playing the lead role in achieving stability in the region, Turkish and/or 
                                                 
3 Rajan Menon & Yuri E. Fedorov & Ghia Nodia, Russia, The Caucuses and 
Central Asia:  The 21st Century Security Environment, Volume 2 (EastWest Institute, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1999) 173 
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Iranian leadership in the region could only further destabilize the economic potential and 
result in greater political instability, opening the door for more fundamentalist threats. 
With weakening Western influence, Russian economic troubles, and crumbling 
economies, the countries of Central Asia could turn to Iran, China or even the Taliban for 
assistance.  The consequences of these strengthening relations are hard to fathom, but it is 
clear that it can only lessen the influence of Western policies in the region.  With 
Russias economy potentially on the rise, it provides a far better alternative for the West 
and a more predictable future for Central Asia.  This thesis contends that Russia -- by 
history, economic and political linkage -- can play a positive role in developing and 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis assesses the need for U.S.-Russian cooperation in Central Asia to 
create a stronger, more reliable long-term stability in the region.  Current United States 
policy toward Russia in Central Asia is tailored to isolate and minimize Russian 
influence, due in great part to a perception that Russian heavy-handedness is restricting 
political and economic development in Central Asia.  Reforming Central Asia to be less 
dependent on Russia has been a centerpiece of U.S. policy as recently as the fiscal year 
2001 foreign policy funding debate.4 
This thesis provides U.S. foreign policy makers with an alternative view on 
Russia.  This view supports a new policy that encourages a more sustainable multi-lateral 
approach to stability in the region and more accurately assesses the real threats to the 
region.  Isolating Russia from its sensitive southern tier could lead to unforeseen 
consequences in Russian foreign policy.  Anatol Lieven points out: 
 if Russia were in fact forced to abandon her present very weak and 
qualified imperial identity, it might swing to something very much 
worse.  This would be especially true if Russia were to be simultaneously 
excluded from Western institutions and surrounded by a ring of Western-
backed states with strong and strongly anti-Russian official national 
identities and programs.5 
 
                                                 
4  Chapter III addresses this issue in more detail the reference is from the 
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001, U.S. 
Department of State, March 15, 2000 
5 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1998), 382 
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The conclusion that a participatory Russia in Central Asia is far better than an 
isolated one follows from an analysis of the historical development of the Central Asian 
nation-states down to today; from analysis of the positive and negative activities of 
Russia in Central Asia, and from an examination of the activities of other regional 
players. 
This thesis argues that individual nations as defined by Ernest Renan may not 
exist in Central Asia: 
A nation is a soul, a mental principle.  Two things that are in fact one and 
the same constitute this principle.  One of them is a store of memories, the 
other is the currently valid agreement, the wish to live togetherA nation, 
then, is an extended community with a peculiar sense of kinship sustained 
by an awareness of the sacrifices that have been made in the past, and the 
sacrifices the nation is prepared to make in the future.  A nation presumes 
a past, but the past is summed up in one tangible fact: the agreement, the 
desire to continue a life in common.6 
 
Without shared interests, efforts by the Central Asian states to create a more 
favorable attitude toward cooperation may require external assistance.  The West was 
quick to provide assistance and promote the development of more liberal forms of 
government.  This thesis will argue that the Wests approach to Central Asia has achieved 
little.  In fact, Russian approaches to Central Asia have provided some limited successes, 
and Russian foreign policy positions, while constantly changing and at times ill defined, 
have promoted greater cooperation and reliable short-term solutions. 
                                                 
6 Ernest Renan quoted in the book by Hagen Schulze, translated by William E. 
Yuill: States, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell Publisher, Mass, 1996), 97 
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What makes Central Asia's most appealing to the world is the large deposits of oil 
and natural gas in the area.  Although not as large as the deposits in the Middle East, they 
are far larger than those in Europe and much of the regions potential is unexplored.7  A 
number of pipeline projects are in the works, supported by that include Europe, China, 
the United States, Iran, and Pakistan.  Getting these pipelines built has become a new 
great game in Central Asia. 
This thesis further argues that the other regional players in this great game have 
less influence on behalf of regional stability than Russia 
This thesis assesses the major characteristics of the region in order to evaluate 
U.S. policies of the past.  This thesis does not delve into the argument over whether 
Central Asia is worth U.S. and Western attention or the level it deserves.  What is most 
important is the relationship between the United States and the West toward Russia in the 
region.  The result of this analysis is that the relationship should be far more cooperative 
than it is today. 
                                                 
7 Zanny Minton Beddoes: A Caspian Gamble: A survey of Central Asia, 
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II.  CENTRAL ASIAS ILL-DEFINED NATION-STATES 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
On April 17, 2000 Madeline Albright, United States Secretary of State, told the 
leaders of Central Asia: 
A democratic and open society will provide the best defense against 
extremism and terrorism and the most hospitable environment for the 
transition to a prosperous, modern market economy.8 
 
Secretary Albright was responding to the growing trend in Central Asia away 
from the democratic principles that by the United States and the West support and toward 
regimes that are more authoritarian.  Secretary Albright was also encouraging the Central 
Asian states to re-energize the move toward a more modern, Western-leaning society.  By 
linking stability with democratic reform and stronger relations with the West, Secretary 
Albright was re-iterating the held belief in the West that Central Asias reliance on Russia 
inhibits development and in turn only guarantees greater instability or at a minimum the 
continuing state of instability today. 
For the nations of Central Asia, creating a more stabile region is not as easy as 
Secretary Albright assumes.  Only three months later President Emomali Rahmonov of 
Tajikistan noted, The policy of consolidating strategic partnership relations with Russia 
has always been and remains invariable.9  President Rahmonov was discussing the 
                                                 
8 Agence France Presse, 17 April 2000. 
9 British Brodcasting Corporation, 25 July 2000. 
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importance of retaining Russian military presence in Tajikistan to help control separatist 
movements from Afghanistan. 
A common belief is that instability on the Russian periphery is due in part to the 
repressive nature of the Soviet Union during the 20th century.  Under Soviet rule, once 
independent nations were unable to sustain or promote any sense of national identity.  
The Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union diluted cultures through Russian 
immigration, emphasis on Russian over native languages and destroyed national 
movements as they developed.  Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian Republics 
have become unstable because ethnic groups have re-emerged, challenging the authority 
and legitimacy of the governments in power.   
B.  HISTORYS UNDEFINING LESSON 
This chapter demonstrates that Central Asias history does not provide a basis for 
the five separate nation-states that exist today.    In Central Asia there was little in the 
way of national identity before Russian Colonialism beginning in the 18th century.   In 
Central Asia, the nation-state did not exist. 
1. Pre-Soviet History 
Central Asia was a center of great power competition for many centuries.   A 
great game took place between Great Britain and Russia for Central Asia during the 
18th and 19th centuries.  However, this great game was not for some grand prize in Central 
Asia.  Rather, it was for a larger prize  India and control of South Asia.  As early as the 
reign of Peter the Great, the Russians hoped to develop land routes to transport riches 
from India that by sea could take more than a year.  The nomadic people of the Central 
Asian region were easy pickings for developed nations to conquer.  The competition for 
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and continual occupation of the region by the great powers would prevent Central Asians 
from ever developing a national sense, whether as individual nations or a collection of 
separate nations. 10 
Samuel Huntington states that in Central Asia, national identities did not exist 
and that loyalty was to the tribe, clan, and extended family, not to the state.11   
Huntington goes on to portray Central Asia as being a part of a greater Islamic 
civilization and that the de-colonization or breakup of the Soviet Union has created a 
commonality among the peoples of Central Asia.  For supporters of Huntingtons view, 
this may provide a potential for future cooperation and a greater link to neighboring 
Islamic countries like Turkey or Iran.  However, others argue that the Islamic connection 
in Central Asia may only be skin deep.   
Some scholars go even farther to discredit even the notion that Central Asia has a 
shared Islamic tradition.   Discounting the two primary characteristics of a nation, 
language and religion, Rajan Menon states: 
                                                 
10 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia 
(Kodansha International, New York, 1990), 16. 
11 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (Simon and Schuster), New York, 1996),  175. 
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Those Western analysts who believed that the linguistic ties among the 
Turkic-speaking peoples might unify them or create an affinity with the 
Turks of Anatolia failed to note that the languages of Central Asia are 
different enough from Anatolian Turkish that identity is merely an 
intellectual conceit.  Not only are linguistic linkages weak but also how 
they view the character of their religion is quite different from neighboring 
Islamic countries.     Muslim which became the ubiquitous title for 
Central Asian native peoples does not necessarily refer to a religious 
conviction.  Rather, it includes cultural and even geographic identity that 
is something akin to European for many westerners.  To identify oneself 
as Muslim in Central Asia is far more complex and may represent a very 
loosely formed, weakly committed identity.12 
 
Whether one believes there is a loosely shared culture somewhere in Central 
Asias history or not is debatable.  However, by examining the history of each of the five 
countries of Central Asia it will become more abundantly clear that history only dims the 
a sense of national identity.  
Kazakhstan is the largest country geographically and has the second largest 
economy of Central Asia (after Uzbekistan).  The word Kazakh has evolved from its 
original Turkic meaning of renegade or outlaw to the Russian word Kazaky or Cossacks, 
which describes Russian peasants who live on the frontier.   During the 15th-18th centuries 
an empire made up of peoples descended from the tribes of East Central Asia Golden 
Horde existed in the Central Asian region.  This empire, like others in the region, was an 
association of separate tribes of people.  As the Russians migrated into the region the 
three great tribes, Little Horde, Middle Horde and Great Horde looked to Russia 
for protection against stronger tribes to the east.  Russian protection came with a price, 
                                                 
12 Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov & Ghia Nodia, Russia, The Caucasus and 
Central Asia:  The 21st Century Security Environment, Volume 2 (EastWest Institute, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 161-165. 
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the creation of Russian military bases and suppression of tribal leaders.  Russians began 
to populate the region in increasing numbers, which has resulted in the present day large 
number of Russians residing in northern Kazakhstan. 
Uzbekistan today is one of the most repressive regimes in Central Asia.  Despite 
this fact, Uzbekistan is and has been one the highest recipients of economic aid from the 
West and even as recently as June 2000 was applauded during Congressional hearings in 
Washington, DC.  However, the basis for the existence of Uzbekistan as a nation can be 
questioned, in fact possibly more so than any other nation in Central Asia. 
It is unknown exactly when and how many Uzbek speaking tribes migrated to 
Central Asia.  Uzbek tribes arrived in Central Asia sometime during the 15th century. 
The territory which is now Uzbekistan has a far richer history than the Uzbeki people, 
dating back to the Persian Empire as well as Alexander the Great.  The Uzbeks remained 
nomadic tribes up until the Russians began migrating into the region in the 19th century.   
Similar to the two countries just mentioned, Turkmenistans existence as a nation 
began with the creation of the Turkmen Republic under the Soviet Union.  Before this, 
Turkmens were nomadic farmers who have more in common with Ottoman Turks and 
Azerbaijanis than their neighbors in Central Asia.   
Today, Turkmenistans increasing ties with Iran betrays another reality of 
Turkmen history, Turkmens claim to be Moslem by heritage.  However, there is little 
proof that the tribes of the Turkmen region were any less secular than Moslems during 
the Soviet period.   
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Tajikistan today is the country with the highest level of internal instability and 
problems of national identity.  The countrys history is one of continual assimilation.  
Whether during the reign of Alexander the Great or Afghanistans rule in the eighteenth 
century, Tajiks have always failed to come together under any semblance of a Tajik state.   
Isolated by severe mountainous terrain, the Tajiks spent more time fighting each other (as 
they do today) than challenging invading powers.  In fact, the Soviet Union found so little 
potential in the Tajiks ability to govern that they always sent outsiders in to fill the 
primary positions of leadership. 
The Kyrgyz, nomadic as well, lived in the Tien Shan Mountains since the 16th 
Century.  They did not develop a written form of the Kyrgyz language until very late.  
Therefore, it is difficult to know the precise nature and history of their language and 
culture.  During the middle of the 19th century, Russian colonization found little 
resistance from these nomadic tribes, which became part of Russian and then Soviet 
Turkistan.  Kyrgyzstan became a separate autonomous Soviet Republic in 1936. 
2.  Soviet Central Asia  Redefining Nationhood 
 
The nomadic history of Pre-Soviet Central Asia gives little hope to finding a 
shared history to help spur cooperation and a sense of commonality among Central Asian 
countries.  Central Asias existence under Soviet control for over 70 years provides even 
less. 
Soviet rule reduced what semblance of national or regional identity existed with a 
concentrated policy to stamp out the potential for national feelings to develop.  The 
national delimitation of Central Asia, carried out by the Bolsheviks in 1924-1925, 
resulted in the creation of five territorial-administrative units.  These new formations 
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were multi-ethnic.  Geographic boundaries further weakened national aspirations.  Ethnic 
diversity greatly increased in the following decades.   
During the period from 1925 into the early 1940s hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants, mostly from the western (Slav) republics moved into the Central Asian 
republics.  They included Communist Party activists, administrators, military, security, 
and law enforcement personnel; professional and skilled technicians; also political exiles 
and disinherited kulaks (the wealthier members of society, especially prosperous 
peasants).   
During the Second World War, there was another wave of immigration.  Many of 
these worked in industrial enterprises relocated from the endangered western republics to 
Central Asia.  The largest group of new arrivals, however, was the so-called punished 
peoples (those accused of treason by the Soviet Union).  The Soviet Union exiled nearly 
3 million members of such groups during the period 1936-1952 to Central Asia.   
A third period of immigration occurred the Stalin period.  This was mainly Slav 
and connected to the grandiose development projects such as the plowing up of the virgin 
lands of Kazakhstan under Khrushchev.   Thus, by the last decades of the Soviet period 
Central Asia had over 100 ethnic minorities.  This created a central historical and cultural 
divide between the immigrant and the indigenous communities.13 
The Soviet Union also created arbitrary borders to further reduce the potential for 
nationalist feelings that could challenge Soviet rule.  The Soviet definition of nation 
reached its fruition under Josef Stalin when they were characterized by a common 
                                                 
13 Minority Rights Group International, Central Asia: Conflict or Stability and 
Development, 1997. 
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language, territory, psychological makeup and historical experience.14  In Central Asia, 
territory fit within Stalins model.  However, the Soviets would need to develop the other 
characteristics from scratch.    For example, in 1920 the Russians incorporated the 
Uzbeks into an area the Russians declared Russian Turkestan and further assimilated 
Uzbeks into the autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkestan.  As part of the 
Soviet program to divide Central Asia republics along ethnic lines, the Soviets created the 
Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924.  This included Tajikistan, which the Soviet 
Union later awarded autonomy as a Soviet republic in 1929.  As a result, during Soviet 
rule there was little in the way of nationalist movements in Uzbekistan, and it was not 
until Gorbachevs perestroika that any such movements developed. 
This suggests that there existed little in the way of national identity before the 
Soviet Unions existence, yet it would not be fair to say that no nationalist movements 
existed or attempted to gain power before the Soviet collapse.  In Kazakhstan, a number 
of national movements did occur during the early 20th century, one of which led to the 
creation of a Kazakh national government, which occupying Red Army forces eliminated 
during the Russian Civil War in 1919-1920. 
3.  Soviet Unions Diminishing Days 
The last days of Gorbachev and the Soviet Unions rule provided a grand 
opportunity for the leaders of today to emerge and for the modern day character of each 
country to appear. 
                                                 
14 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, revised edition (Cambridge 
Press, Mass., 1964), 21-41. 
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During Gorbachevs perestroika, national parties began to emerge in the republics 
of Central Asia.  These parties evolved from the older, more restrictive communist parties 
that avoided or even repressed the movements for change under perestroika.  Some of 
these developments even led to riots, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan in 1990.  These 
movements were more anti-Soviet than nationalist.  What materialized from these 
changes under Soviet rule was not as much a group of leaders backed by ethnic and/or 
national pride but leaders who as part of the Soviet elite would work to sustain their own 
power.  The personalization of power under certain charismatic leaders first played itself 
out during the coup against Gorbachev and has remained a primary characteristic for the 
governments of Central Asia today. 
As the coup materialized, some leaders in the Central Asian republics took a wait-
and-see approach to determine which side would prevail before making a move.  The 
importance was not national self-determination; rather it was the ruling elites attempts to 
nourish power.  For example, the leader of the Uzbek Communist Party, Islam Karimov 
who many leaders in Moscow at the time considered a survivor of the old communist 
regime, said little until the coup failed.  However, once the failure was complete, he 
moved quickly to condemn and ban those communist elements in Uzbekistan who had 
supported the coup.  He reconstituted the Communist Party as the Peoples Democratic 
Party of Uzbekistan and stated, The experiment of communism has failed.  However, 
Karimov continued to ban public meetings, under the guise of preventing inter-ethnic 
strife, and said that the main slogan of the new party was discipline and order. 15  
                                                 
15 The Independent (London), 18 September 1991. 
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Karimov and the other leaders of Central Asia transitioned from leaders of a Soviet 
Republic to newly independent states.   
The coup allowed the leaders of Central Asia to align themselves with the forces 
of change and independence.  Those in power identified those who had supported the 
coup as repressive and foreign.   Soviet leaders in Central Asia became overnight the 
liberators and protectors of their republics.  As protectors, they could eliminate 
opposition and begin the process of redefining government institutions to support their 
hold on power.   The euphoria shared by many in the West for a new beginning and a 
hope for the spread of democracy throughout Central Asia should have been severely 
dampened by the reality that the leaders still in power were those installed by the Soviet 
Regime they had supposedly separated from.  These were not leaders of any reform or 
independence movements within their countries.  They were opportunists, who because 
their countries lacked a defined history or lack traditions of being a nation-state in the 
past, could move very quickly to define the character of their new independent state not 
on any sense of shared cultural values, but on their own personal character of leadership.  
C.  PRESENT DAY CENTRAL ASIA  DEMOCRACYS FAILURE  
Central Asia today resembles much of what it has been for its entire history 
nations struggling to find an identity, playing geopolitical hot potato with neighboring 
powers, and facing instability caused by those who do not want to be a part of these 
newly created countries.  Military capabilities are reaching ever-deeper lows.  Big powers 
are competing to create pipelines that move energy by routes that avoid avoiding the 
other big powers.  Russian troops patrol many of the border regions.  The countries 
themselves are enmeshed in multiple security arrangements led and exploited by bigger 
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countries. A potential Islamic threat, while not fully defined, looms as a threat in the 
future. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West saw an opportunity to create new 
democracies, first in Russia, and then along its periphery.   The Clinton Administrations 
program of enlargement and engagement placed democracy as a central element in 
promoting a greater political, economic and military independence throughout Russias 
near abroad.   Secretary Albrights statement cited in the previous section reiterated the 
Clinton Administrations frustration in its waning days over democracys utter failure to 
take hold in Central Asia.   
The five countries of Central Asia today are not democracies.  With the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Western democratic countries moved quickly to provide government 
assistance, sponsor non-governmental organizations, and supervise the conduct of 
elections and the creation of democratic institutions in Central Asia.  However, these 
countries made little progress toward a commitment to democratic principles.  While 
each has had at some point a contested election, their rather predictable results created 
more questions of legitimacy than answers.   
Table 1 below shows how Freedom House rates the levels of democracy in 
Central Asia.  As is evident, aside from initial elections immediately following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, all five countries quickly slid down the democratic scale 
and have reached or are nearing the same level of freedom and protection of rights that 
China now enjoys.      
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Table 1:  Freedom House Freedom Ratings 
Yr Kyrgyzstan Turkmen Kazakhstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Russia China 
1991 5,4 6,5 5,4 3,3 6,5 3,3 7,7 
1996 4,4 7,7 6,5 7,7 7,7 3,4 7,7 
1997 4,4 7,7 6,5 7,7 7,6 3,4 7,7 
1998 4,4 7,7 6,5 6,6 7,6 3,4 7,7 
1999 5,5 7,7 6,5 6,6 7,6 4,4 7,6 
2000 5,5 7,7 6,5 6,6 7,6 4,5 7,7 
Political Rights / Civil Liberties16 
1.0  2.5      Free 
3.0  5.5      Partly Free 
5.5  7.0      Not Free 
Larry Diamond provides an even better tool for clearly understanding how far the 
countries of Central Asia are from a western style democracy.    Diamond identifies 
three characteristics that are present in illiberal democracies17: 
• Highly delegative and mainly electoral in nature. 
• Political institutions that constrain the executive branch are weak. 
• Rule of law is tenuous and human rights are violated.  
In March 2001, the U.S. State Department issued a human rights report that was 
severely critical of Kazakhstan.  The report addresses each of the three characteristics 
outlined by Diamond.  The report noted that government corruption was pervasive, that 
the authorities limited the right of citizens to change their government and harassed 
opposition media.   
However, the Central Asian governments are quick to discount Western criticism 
of their forms of government.  Kazakhstans Foreign Minister Yerlan Idrisov stated that 
                                                 
16 Taken from Freedom House Country Ratings, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm, viewed 22 March 2001 
17 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation (The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 45-47. 
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his country was not prepared to accept fabrications in such an important sphere for 
Kazakhstan as democracy.18  Kazakhstans failure to address these real concerns is once 
again another example of the failure of democracy to take hold. 
As noted earlier the governments of Central Asia moved quickly to consolidate 
executive power.  While relations with the West increased, the development of 
institutions supportive of democratic ideals did not materialize.  The relationships the 
regimes in power have with Western governments and non-government organizations 
tend to only legitimize the illiberal forms of government in place (chapter IV will explore 
further).  
Some in the West see little choice for these countries.  S. Frederick Starr, 
Chairman of the Central Asia Institute at John Hopkins University believes that 
whichever path these countries chose, they all feel the need to strengthen state 
authority in the face of what they fear could become divisive and destructive internal 
forces. 
With democracys failure in Central Asia self-evident, the countries must find 
alternative approaches to short-term stability.  During her visit, Secretary Albright did not 
mention the need to promote cooperation with Russia.   For the West, since 1994, closer 
relations with Russia and democratic development have decoupled. 19  The result has 
                                                 
18 Agence France Presse, 23 March 2001 
19 In February 1994, the United States switched its policy toward Russia from one 
of economic aid designed to help the legitimacy of the Yeltsin Regime, to one focused on 
the periphery of Russia.  This will be addressed in Chapter 2.  
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been little cooperation with regarding its near abroad.  U.S. officials stated publicly that 
providing aide to former Soviet Republics would assist these Republics in weaning 
themselves of their dependence on Moscow, and create opportunities for Russian 
imperialism will be decreased.20  In diplomacy, the mighty dollar was trumping Russian 
influence, and Russian incoherence in its policies abroad gave little option for the former 
Soviet Republics.   
D.  CONCLUSION 
With a lack of identity and little hope for achieving democracy in the future, 
Central Asia is ill prepared to reduce its predominant relationship with Russia.   
Central Asias history, as shown briefly here, provided an incubational 
environment for strong authoritarian rule.  The result is leadership in each of the five 
Central Asian states assuming the characteristics of personalist rule.  Stephen Blank 
notes: 
It (personalism) encourages disaffected mutineers, ethnic or otherwise, to 
plot with foreign elements who are all too willing to support these plots 
for their own gains.  Personalism also discourages political 
institutionalization and the rule of law.21   
 
This examination of Central Asias history and present struggles with building 
democracy portray a region unprepared to develop and implement independent foreign 
policies in the international arena.  Weakly defined nation-states have little option but to 
look toward other powers for protection.  Stephen M. Walt points out that as nations 
                                                 
20 Associated Press, 9 Mar 1994. 
21 Stephen J. Blank, U.S. Military Engagement with Tanscaucasia and Central 
Asia (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998) 18 
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become weaker and their alternatives lessen, they are more likely to enter an alliance of 
necessity rather than desire.  Walt states, If weak states see no possibility of outside 
assistancethey may be forced to accommodate the most imminent threat.22 
This chapter has described Central Asia as a region of weak states.  Chapter III 
will demonstrate that Russia is the best option for accommodation.  The fourth chapter 
will show that Russia is not an imminent threat and will actually provide a better option 
than Walts last option.   
                                                 
22 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances,(Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 21
III.  A COOPERATIVE RUSSIAS PLACE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Russia is the dominant power in Central Asia.  The previous chapter assessed 
Russias historical relationship with Central Asia.  Until the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991, Russia enjoyed its position as the strongest player in the region.  Through political, 
economic and military dominance, Russia was able to assure Central Asian dependence.   
Today Russias economic collapse, growing isolation from Western economies 
and loss of superpower status have dramatically reduced Russian influence in Central 
Asia and, most importantly, Central Asian countries dependence on Russia for security 
as well as political and economic stability.    
Despite this lessening, Central Asias need for strong political and economic ties 
with Russia continues.  Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States are the largest economic partners with Central Asia.  The dramatic economic 
challenges of the region have reduced Western investment and while Chinese investment 
continues to rise, it remains a small fraction of the economic relationship with Russia. 
The West has encouraged Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union to 
increase political, military and economic ties with the West, thereby lessening its 
dependence on Russia.   The United States most recent statement of its national interest 
with regard to Kyrgyzstan underscores this point:   
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A democratic, secure and prosperous Kyrgyzstan would be less vulnerable 
to Chinese and Iranian economic influence, less dependent on Russia, 
more capable of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), better able to protect human rights, better prepared to 
halt environmental degradation, and more effective in combating 
transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking and financial crime.23 
 
What is most evident in this statement is the inclusion of dependence on Russia 
among other far more dramatic threats to stability in the region.  In fact, Western policy 
has continued to limit potential Russian cooperation in the region, to the point of 
attempting to develop energy pipelines that avoid Russian territory.   
This chapter will address the potential for Russian cooperation in Central Asia.  
Examples of how Russia is willing to cooperate with other nations in promoting stability 
in the region will clarify Russia's degree of cooperativeness.  The chapter will also 
demonstrate that, while Russian stated security and foreign policy objectives and its 
military doctrine have become more belligerent, Russian actions over the last few years 
have demonstrated a greater willingness to cooperate than the political hyperbole 
spewing from Moscow.  This chapter will demonstrate that Russian policy toward 
Central Asia lacks clarity, due in great part to Russias own political and economic 
challenges.  The lack of such a clear, coherent, widely accepted national identity 
remains at the core of Russias lack of clarity in Foreign policy.24   
                                                 
23 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001, 
U.S. Department of State, March 15, 2000 
24 Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov and Ghia Nodia, Russia, The Caucuses and 
Central Asia:  The 21st Century Security Environment, Volume 2 (EastWest Institute, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 173 
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Russia actually shares many of the concerns that Central Asian states have 
regarding identity and national purpose.  Russia is in the process of discovering its place 
in the international arena, as are the states of Central Asia.   Russias weakening in the 
region could bring greater threats to Central Asian stability, as will be noted in Chapter 
III.  Those that say Russian heavy-handedness 25 is a major component of Central 
Asian instability may assume a more consistent Russian policy toward the region exists. 
B.  RUSSIAS HEAVY-HANDEDNESS, THE UNCOOPERATIVE RUSSIA 
ARGUMENT 
The preceding chapter illuminated Russias historical presence in Central Asia.  
Since Russia colonized the region in the early 19th century, it has continued to be the 
major player, politically, militarily, and most importantly economically.  Exploiting 
Central Asias dependence has been a staple of Russian policy in the region.  In the mid 
1990s, Russia used transportation routes to blackmail Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
which include nearly shutting down Kazakhstans oil economy in 1994.26   
Russias pressure on Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, to hold the 
line on CIS participation is in line with one of the principal tasks of their new National 
Security Doctrine, which seeks to create a single economic domain with the members of 
the CIS.   The National Security Document as well as the Foreign Policy Doctrine is 
even more important for Central Asia in so far as they lack any emphasis on assisting 
former Soviet Republics in economic and political reform.   The document implies that 
                                                 
25 Stephen J. Blank, Russia and China in Central Asia, Imperial Decline: 
Russias Changing Role in Asia, edited by Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 
(Duke University Press, Durham, 1997), p. 47 
26 Stephen J. Blank & Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Russias Changing Role in Asia, 
(Duke University Press, 1997), p. 45 
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Russia cares only for promoting stability and the status quo along its borders, rather for 
creating independent states that can orient themselves away from CIS and Russian 
influence. 
A major factor in Russia maintaining its strong presence is the large numbers of 
Russians living in the region.  At the end of the Soviet era, Central Asia was home to 
nearly 10 million Russians and other Slavs.  Two-thirds of these lived in Kazakhstan, 
where they nearly outnumbered the Kazakhs.  While Russians have continued to emigrate 
out of Central Asia in search of greater economic opportunity, they still amount to a large 
minority.  Russian statements have made it clear that protection of Russians abroad is a 
major element of their national security policy. 
Central Asia is also important for Russian communications with its eastern 
regions, since communication lines cross Kazakh territory.   In addition, Russia imports 
an abundance of minerals from Kazakhstan that are of economic importance.  While 
these are important, they do not warrant the attention that energy resources do. 
After a CIS military structure failed to develop, Russias new strategy of 
emphasizing bilateral relations first, as they do with NATO and the European Union, has 
led each Central Asian country to create bilateral military agreements with Russia.  
Russia has retained the right to maintain and operate military installations in the 
territories of all five states.  However, the actual number of Russian military personnel is 
small except in Tajikistan. 
C.  THE COOPERATIVE RUSSIA     
While Russia appears to be playing a heavy hand today in Central Asia, in 
February of 1992 the new Russia, just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was far 
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more accommodating toward the West.  Their document On Basic Principles of Russian 
Federation Foreign Policy promoted Russian national security by eliminating its military 
presence abroad, strengthening the belt of good-neighborliness along the entire Russian 
perimeter, and reducing the need for military intervention in the world.  The document 
also encouraged closer ties with the United States and the West in developing global and 
regional security frameworks.27 
In 1993, Russia published a security concept that redefined its relationship with 
the West in terms that were more cordial.  Russian security focused on developing a 
closer relationship with the West while conducting massive reforms politically, 
economically and militarily.   For the leading countries of the West, the new atmosphere 
affirmed that Western ideals had triumphed over the Soviet Union, and now Russia and 
other countries of the former Soviet Union were enhancing their military-to-military 
cooperation, accepting Western political and economic assistance, and conducting 
foreign policy programs predicated on accommodation rather than Soviet agitation.  
Unfortunately for the West, this love affair lasted only a few years.  In the fall of 1998, 
the Russian economy collapsed, resulting in high inflation, ruble devaluation and the 
possibility of defaulting on the numerous loans granted earlier in the decade.  Russia was 
reduced to an international beggar, and was forced to renegotiate International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) loans as it tried to gain new financial assistance while attempting to control 
                                                 
27 George Ginsburgs, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Oles M. Smolansky, Russia and 
America, From Rivalry to Reconciliation,(M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,1993) 278. 
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its failing economy.  The financial collapse coincided with NATO expansion, followed 6 
months later with NATO action in Kosovo.   
NATO conducted its campaign in Kosovo only 2 years after admitting three new 
member nations, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.   Russian political leaders had 
been warning against NATO expansion, but had come to accept the addition of its new 
members.   
With all these events occurring in such a short time, Russian hardliners seized the 
opportunity to push for a stronger security policy that defined the West not as its future 
partner, but as a possible danger.  By the fall of 1999, Russia published a new security 
concept bringing renewed fears in the West that Russia was returning to its old Soviet 
strategic thinking.  Russian politicians, including presumably Western-oriented thinking 
ones, became more and more anti-Western in their approach to security issues, blaming 
the West not only for Russias economic state of affairs but also for the rapid decline in 
the quality and quantity of their armed forces.  The concept also defined Russias 
international role as a facilitator of a new multi-polar world that would question NATO 
expansion in Europe and U.S. dominance in the world.  Russia also declared to the world 
that it was a significant power. The new concept emphasized the need for greater Russian 
participation in the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), as well as for strengthening the Commonwealth of Independent States 
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(CIS), but the concept made little mention of Russias security issues or its position in 
other regions of the world, including Asia. 28  
The limited reference to Asia in the new concept underscores Russias inability to 
understand and therefore define its role in Asia.  Since the demise of the Soviet Union, 
Russia has continued each year to reach new lows in its political, economic and military 
influence in Asia.  While Russians continue to say publicly that they should be treated as 
an equal on the world stage and likewise as a major player in Asia, Russia has failed at 
the same time to put in place any policy that clearly defines how Russia plans to become 
a respected power in Asia. 
More specifically, regarding Central Asia, Vladimir Putin on April 21, 2000 in the 
Russian Security Council noted, We must understand that the interest of our partners in 
other countriesTurkey, Great Britain, and the United Statestoward the Caspian Sea is 
not accidental.  This is because we are not active.  We must not turn the Caspian Sea into 
yet another area of confrontation, no way.  We just have to understand that nothing will 
fall into our lap out of the blue, like manna from heaven.  This is a matter of competition 
and we must be competitive.29 Further the Russian foreign policy concept states: 
                                                 
28 Russias National Security Concept, translated by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS), http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfeb00/docjf00.htm, 
viewed 23 February 2001 
29 Russian Public Television, Moscow, 21 April 2000 from BBC Monitoring. 
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Serious emphasis will be made on the development of economic 
cooperation, including the creation of a free-trade zone and 
implementation of programs for joint, rational use of natural resources.  
Specifically, Russia will work for such a zone in the Caspian Sea, enabling 
the littoral states to develop mutually advantageous cooperation.  Caspian 
states would use the regions resources on a fair basis by taking into 
account the legitimate interests of one another.30 
 
Russia feels the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)31 is proper.  As Yevgeny 
Primakov stated, Russia viewed the construction through Russian territory as an 
important state task, the solution of which would both give certain economic benefit and 
serve for consolidation of relations with CIS countries, first of all with Kazakhstan.32 
The abundance of energy pipelines on the drawing board could potentially 
transform Kazakhstan and Turkmenistans economies (the two with the greatest energy 
deposits) and create real economic powers.  However, Caspian oil production is high-
cost, compared to world standards, so much so that its narrow profit margins available 
imperil its very development.  These costs and unreliable estimates give Russia an even 
greater foothold in pipeline development. 
                                                 
30 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by the 
President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, 28 June 2000. 
31 Caspian Pipeline Consortium, a Russian led group, runs from the huge Tengiz 
oil field in Western Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk and has 
an initial capacity of 560,000 barrels a day.  
32 Oksana Polishuk, Primakov and Chevron President discuss Caspion oil main, 
 ITAR-TASS, 24 January 1998. 
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For Russia, the economic linkages are far more clearly defined than the security 
issues in Central Asia.  A feasible strategic defense policy is dependent on its definition 
of the primary threat.  The security concept identifies the following threats33: 
 The desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of 
existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United 
Nations and the OSCE;  
 The danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military 
influence in the world;  
 The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's 
eastward expansion;  
 The possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military 
presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders;  
 Proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles;  
 Territorial claims on Russia.  
 Threats to the Russian Federation's national security in the international 
sphere can be seen in attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of 
Russia as one of the influential centers of a multi-polar world, to hinder the 
exercise of its national interests and to weaken its position in Europe, the 
Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region. 
Terrorism represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian 
Federation. International terrorism is waging an open campaign to destabilize 
Russia. 
 
Russia continues to view NATO expansion as a direct threat to its security.  
Russia feels NATO is expanding in order to counter a perceived Russian threat.  Russia 
also believes NATOs actions in Kosovo, without U.N. support, demonstrates that NATO 
will not hesitate to move on the offensive when its interests are in danger.   
                                                 
33 Russias National Security Concept, translated by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS), http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfeb00/docjf00.htm 
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Defining the NATO threat has always been a central debate with the Russian 
federation and Soviet Union before.   In the late 1980s, reformers within the Gorbachev 
regime were frustrated with the Russian General Staffs view of an imperialist NATO 
and a requirement for more military spending to offset the threat, despite the improving 
international situation and decrease in tensions.  One of these reformers, Anatolii 
Chernyaev, felt that Soviet military reforms were a requirement no matter what the 
perceived threat of NATO was real or not.34  
The NATO debate continued even after Gorbachev announced a unilateral 
reduction of Soviet forces in 1988, only to be followed by Soviet military analysis that 
NATO was continuing to develop offensive strategies designed against the Soviet 
Union.35  In 1997, two years prior to the new security concept, General Rodionov and 
other top military leaders resisted military reforms, due in great part to their continued 
obsession with the NATO threat. 36      
For Russia, the burden of identifying the West as a potential threat can have 
devastating economic consequences.   Russias conventional forces today are simply too 
large for the economic resources available, which, against the background of drastic 
decline in budgetary resources, the size of the armed forces seems completely out of 
                                                 
34 William Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1998), p. 95 
35 Andrei Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998), p. 
143. 
36 Antol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, (Yale University Press, 
Newhaven, 1999), p. 194 
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proportion.37  In fact, these conventional force allocations are so low, Russia finds itself 
unable to dismantle the numerous ships in its fleet inventories, relying on Japanese and 
Western assistance to pay for their destruction, among other problems.  Russian forces 
stationed in outer regions have also begun to rely on regional government funding in 
addition to selling equipment and even manpower to pay for basic subsistence.  Russias 
new military doctrine points out the need to take into account the countrys economic 
potential when determining force structure and placement. 
Russias continuing actions in Tajikistan help highlight the problems Russia faces 
in projecting its presence when economics do not support it.  Ironically, the civil war in 
Tajikistan did not begin with a radical Islamic attempt to seize power, but rather with a 
loose alignment of Western-style democrats and moderate Islamists, primarily from the 
eastern provinces of Garm and Pamir, ousting an old-line Communist leader. When the 
Communists came back into power with the help of Uzbek and Soviet military forces, 
many Islamists fled across the border into Afghanistan, where they became radicalized, 
and then mounted attacks back across the border into Tajikistan.  In the process they 
killed some Russian soldiers guarding the Tajik border and drew Moscow into the 
fighting, posing a serious problem for Russian leaders who had no desire to get too 
deeply involved in another Afghanistan-type war in Central Asia. Under these 
circumstances, a diplomatic settlement of the war in Tajikistan became an important 
                                                 
37 Alexei Arbatov, Military Reform in Russia, International Security Volume 
22:4, p.98 
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objective for Yeltsin, though some elements in the Russian Defense Ministry appeared to 
prefer fighting there to revenge Russia's defeat by Islamists in Afghanistan. 38   
Russias national security concept defines Russia as a great power and as one of 
the influential centers of a multi-polar world.  Russias military doctrine defines one 
main external threat as foreign governments attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian 
Federations interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its 
strengthening as one influential center in a multi-polar world.39  The later is a direct 
reference to NATO actions in Kosovo.  The military doctrine also goes farther to define 
the expansion of some present military blocs and alliances as detrimental to Russian 
military security. 
A Russian attempt to solidify the CIS in Central Asia is partly in response to 
NATO/Western inroads along the Russian periphery. The ambiguity of NATO policies as 
they pertain to potential membership and participation in its Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
increase Russian discomfort in the Caucuses and Central Asia.  Russia identifies the 
weakening of integrational processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States; and 
the outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation 
and the external borders of CIS member states40 as potential results of ill-defined or 
cleverly disguised PFP programs in Central Asia.   Russias near-abroad policy has 
                                                 
38 Interfax, 19 November 1993 
39 Russias Military Doctrine, translated by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS) http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/may2000/dc3ma00.htm, 
viewed 11 February 2001 
40 Russias National Security Concept 
http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfeb00/docjf00.htm, viewed 11 February 2001 
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centered much on trying to encourage countries of the former Soviet Union to develop 
more integrated political, economic and military policies 
D.  THE POTENTIAL FOR RUSSIAN COOPERATION, RUSSIAN-U.S. 
RELATIONSHIP 
An ambition of this thesis is to provide information that can help U.S. foreign 
policy makers more clearly understand Russias role in Central Asia.  Therefore, this 
section will explore specifically the damage U.S.-Russian competition in Central Asia 
and how this can affect stability in the region.  This section will address the state of U.S.-
Russian relations following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its present direction.      
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States helped secure and provide 
much of the initial aid to the new Russian government.   U.S. policy originally provided 
the aid in hopes of sustaining Boris Yeltsin position in power and helping to influence the 
internal changes required to transition the Russian economy and society to more 
democratic, free market society.  In 1994, U.S. policy changed because of the ongoing 
conflict in Chechnya, gains by communists and nationalists in the Russian Duma, 
growing American concern regarding Russian suspicious peacekeeping activities in 
Georgia and other issues revolving around the pullout of Russian troops in former Soviet 
republics such as Latvia and Moldova. U.S. policy took on a wait-and-see attitude that 
was far more cautious toward Russia than before. The U.S. also began to increase 
funding to other former Soviet Republics.41 
Since the change in its policy in 1994, the U.S. has continued to look toward 
creating greater stability in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.  In fact, U.S. 
                                                 
41 Washington Post, 5 February 1994. 
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security assistance programs have at times been the leading activity in U.S. bilateral 
relations with the former soviet republics, including Central Asia.  Table 2 demonstrates 
the gradual increase in U.S. International Military Education and Training dollars spent 
since fiscal year 1993.   
The dollars spent on Central Asia as compared to Russia have been continually 
increasing since 1994 with sudden jumps immediately following changes in the U.S.-
Russian relationship.  As noted the change in U.S. policy toward Russia in 1994 would 
explain the significant increase in dollars to Central Asia in 1996.42  The enormous 
increase in 1998 likewise may relate to growing apprehension in the U.S. Congress and 
Administration frustration with political changes in Moscow.  The result is an increase in 
money to promote military reform through education without any substantive results (as 
noted in table 1 in Chapter I) in democratic or military reform. 
                                                 
42 The delay in fiscal budgeting may explain the 1 year delay in the actually 
increase. 
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Table 2: International Military Education and Training Funding43 (thousands) 




Kazakhstan 50 90 100 388 389 587 383 550 600
Kyrgyzstan 0 50 50 231 257 336 383 350 400
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkmenistan 0 50 50 213 262 336 261 300 325
Uzbekistan 0 0 50 293 286 457 526 500 550
Total  
Central Asia 
50 190 250 1125 1194 1715 1553 1700 1875
Russia 700 471 700 760 842 732 228 800 800
 
Almost in-step with the U.S. IMET program, NATOs Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
has expanded its scope in Central Asia.  PfP has as a main objective the 
institutionalization of civilian democratic control over the military.  NATO Secretary 
General Solana said:   
The postwar experience in Western Europe suggests that political and 
economic progress and security integration are closely linked.  A 
responsible military, firmly embedded in our democratic societies and 
under civil control, is part and parcel of that civic space, as are the military 
structures that are transparent, defensive, and multinational.44  
 
                                                 
43 Congressional Presentations for Foreign Operations, U.S. Department of State, 
Fiscal Years 1993-2001.   
44 Stephen J. Blank, U.S. Military Engagement with Tanscaucasia and Central 
Asia (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), p. 2 
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Unfortunately, PfP and other programs promoting democratic reform as a step 
toward integration into Western security organizations have been simply legitimizing the 
non-democratic governments in power.  These programs create a superficial relationship 
from above that never works its way beyond the personal relationships of leaders and 
diplomats to create supporting domestic institutions.  Henry Kissinger notes that PfP is 
essentially therapeutic, aimed at psychological reassurance, far removed from the basic 
NATO mission, which waters down the function of the alliance.45 
While Russia and the United States seem further apart on the question of NATOs 
role, Russia continues to support the most dominant security organization in Central Asia 
today, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).   The OSCE is a 
major component of Russian security and foreign policy goals in Europe.  This past June, 
Russian State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov summed up the Russian position on the 
OSCE: If we enhance the role of the OSCE in proper measure, it can become the main 
organization for Europe in the 21st Century.  He goes on to note that the 1999 Istanbul 
Charter of European Security makes it clear that European Security should be built not on 
NATOs deterring factor but on the OSCE which must become the guarantor security 
and cooperation on the continent.46 
Russias push to enhance the role of the OSCE in Central Asia is important as it 
points out Russias willingness to accept international security organizations along its 
periphery and accept OSCE observers in Chechnya, demonstrating a Russian willingness 
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to participate more deeply in international cooperative efforts than many Western 
thinkers admit.  Russias willingness to promote OSCE has bumped up against what 
Russia perceives as U.S. policy goals.  Russia perceives a three-pronged U.S. security 
concept for Europe. 
 NATO is to play a main role as to what concerns security. 
 The EU (economic cooperation) and the OSCE will address problems of 
human rights, democratic development, and averting conflicts. 
 Heighten the OSCEs interference in internal affairs of states.47 
 
Russian tends to see the United States using the OSCE and Russias desire to 
enhance the OSCE standing as a route to influence the events in Chechnya, remove 
Russian forces from Georgia, and expose the Russian southern flank to future NATO 
presence. It is therefore not surprising to the Russians that Georgia would apply for future 
NATO membership and continue high level talks with NATO at the same time the OSCE 
is present in Georgia.    
The consequence of NATOs enlargement for Russian-U.S. relations is a 
necessity in Europe for sustaining European security.  The geopolitical criteria that 
should be emphasized in Europe  such as, commitment to democracy and shared values, 
an absence of ethnic or territorial disputes with neighbors, territorial contiguity with other 
NATO members48are not as important in Central Asia.  Russias concerns with NATO 
crossing the red line of the border of the former Soviet Union can only be addressed 
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through the promotion of an alternative security organization that places Russia in a 
pivotal position and provides a hierarchical structure for decision making, thus allowing 
the larger countries to take a leading role.  Russias bullying tactics regarding the CIS 
simply do not fit with an organization like NATO that provides equal powers to all 
members. 
An organization similar to the OSCE in Central Asia would work initially as the 
cultural clarity within these nations is far less than it is in Europe.  However, if specific 
events occur that require decisive action, similar to those in the Balkans, it is unlikely that 
this organization could act effectively.  Member countries must have a deep-rooted trust 
in an overarching security organization that only common shared values will bring.  
Fostering those values can initially fall on an OSCE-like organization, but in the end 
must develop into an organizational structure more similar to NATO.   
As previously noted any organizations that rely on shared values may have 
serious trouble in Central Asia. Yet, the constant friction between U.S. and Russian 
policy goals in Europe has continued to play a major part in reducing the effectiveness of 
U.S.-Russian relations in the other regions bordering Russia.  Regarding Central Asia, 
there does not exist a security organization that threatens Russian security.  While a 
weakening of Russian influence in the Caucasus has led some to state that a new oasis is 
developing for NATO on Russian borders, there is no talk of such danger to Russia in 
Central Asia.  In fact, it is the development of other threats such as the Taliban and other 
forms of Islamic extremism (chapter IV) that create some shared interests between the 
United States and Russia in Central Asia.  
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E.  CONCLUSION 
Russia no longer seeks to take on the global, much less ideological, tasks of a 
superpower.  However, Russians believe that Russias place in the world stems from its 
status as not only a European country, but also a great Eurasian power that is responsible 
for maintaining world security on both global and regional levels.49 
This chapter has described how many of Russias actions in Central Asia are 
indeed heavy handed.  However, Russia has generally responded to the efforts of other 
powers to establish standards of appropriate behavior, has worked within the new 
institutional arrangements, like the OSCE in Europe, and has internalized many of the 
new norms of international community.50 
NATO and the OSCE are the only organizations that have the institutions in 
place, which are real alternatives to the CIS in Central Asia.  Democracys failure to 
materialize in Central Asia has led the states to join separate multi-lateral associations 
that meet the specific needs of certain countries.   
A stable Russian economy with an ever more liberal government is also in the 
best U.S. interests.  To continue economic and political reform, Russia must be confident 
in its security.  No matter how false that sense of security maybe and no matter how 
inadequately Russia continues to assess its real threats (considering NATO as a major 
threat), Russia must not become so fearful of the West that it begins to return to the 
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besieged fortress approach to security that was developed by Frunze in 1922 and 
remained a centerpiece of Soviet strategic thinking until well into the 1980s.  A secure 
Russia will be less agitating and more accommodating, as it perceives the United States 
as less of a threat to its own sovereignty, regardless of how far NATO expands.  To 
achieve this In Central Asia, policy must promote Russian cooperation in the region 
rather than isolate it.  Russia needs to be a major player in Central Asia for the region to 
attain political and economic stability. 
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IV.  THE REGIONAL PLAYERS OF CENTRAL ASIA 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters emphasized that Central Asian countries lack the common 
values required to develop unique and independent approaches to security and stability.  
The chapters also showed that Russia can play a positive role in assisting Central Asia 
develop appropriate confidence building measures or cooperative efforts needed to attain 
stability.  This chapter will analyze the other regional players in Central Asia. 
Central Asia has been the center of a number of great games between 
competing regional powers.  Today the region is no different as Central Asias neighbors, 
China, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey, are vying for increasing influence in the 
region.  This chapter explores the role each country has in Central Asia, analyzing the 
positive and negative effects of each countrys approach. This analysis reaches the 
following conclusions: 
 At some level, Central Asia must address the fundamentalist Islamic threat.  
The Pakistani and Afghan roles in perpetuating the Islamic threat are very 
evident. 
 Turkeys limited near-term economic potential significantly reduces its ability 
to promote greater economic growth in Central Asia. 
 Iran is too isolated from the international community to provide any 
meaningful advantage for increased multi-lateral cooperation. 
 Chinese intentions are questionable and potentially destabilizing. 
 
After examination of the role of each of these countries in Central Asia, the 
conclusion is that Russian cooperation with the United States in the region provides the 
most long-term solution to stability in the region. 
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B.  AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND THE ISLAMIC THREAT 
Russia, China, the West and other regional powers in Central Asia have 
continually identified the Islamic threat as one of the more significant threats to stability 
in the region. Those who believe the threat is exaggerated tend to support the thesis, as 
put forward in Chapter I, that Central Asian Islamic beliefs are more secular and less 
accommodating to fundamentalism and that powers such as Russia and China use the 
threat to force their own agendas on Central Asia.  A leading international human rights 
organization summarizes the argument: 
There is a schizophrenic attitude towards Islam in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia.  On the one hand, there is general agreement that Islam is an integral 
part of the national culture; on the other, there is widespread fear of the 
rise of so-called fundamentalism.  This dichotomy is born of a lack of 
genuine familiarity with the religion.  Islamic variations exist.  Pockets of 
devout believers are in the Ferghana Valley (where Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan converge), particularly near Namangan.  This 
region is the heartland of the Islamic Revival Party and smaller groups 
such as Adolat (Justice).  The total membership of these groups is about 
50,000.  Elsewhere in Central Asia, active adherence to Islam is much less 
in evidence.51 
 
This thesis extends the debate by focusing on the primary source of a real Islamic 
fundamentalist threat in Central Asia, the ruling Taliban movement in Afghanistan.  A 
movement based on strict adherence to a southern Afghan interpretation of Islam.  The 
Taliban persecutes opposition, tortures non-believers and restricts the rights of education 
and development to almost all women in their society.  The Taliban, which experts 
perceived as a short-term threat, has increased its hold on Afghanistan.  The Talibans 
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support of Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the world, including support for 
Osama Bin Laden, has isolated it from the international community. 
Pakistan, which shares a border with Afghanistan, has encouraged the countries of 
Central Asia to open a dialogue with the Taliban.  Pakistan is supportive of the Taliban 
regime and hopes that dialogue can eventually lead to substantive discussions on 
developing a pipeline from the gas fields of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to 
Pakistan.  In November 2000, the military ruler of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, 
visited Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and received positive responses from both leaders 
regarding dialogue with the Taliban.52 
Pakistans support for greater acceptance of the Taliban in Central Asia is more 
than just political recognition.  Pakistan has supported Islamic movements in Chinas 
Xinjiang region, provided assistance to Mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, 
and been a player in other Islamic movements along the Russian southern tier.  It is 
reported that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistans main security service, has 
been deeply involved in training and coordinating efforts in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Bosnia 
and Afghanistan, including training Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev in 
Pakistan in 1994.53 
While Russia recently increased dialogue with Pakistan, it has seldom reserved 
comment on its perceptions that Pakistan is supporting Islamic insurgents in Central Asia.  
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Sergei Ivanov, then head of the Russian Security Council, associated the Pakistan-
backed Taliban with the scourge of terrorism that has infected the region.  Mr. 
Ivanovs comments came during a visit to India during which India and Russia pledged to 
increase their strategic relationship and expand interaction between security 
specialists.54  A byproduct of Pakistani involvement with the Taliban and cross-border 
terrorism into Central Asia could be a growth in Indian influence in the region.   
The Central Asian countries increasing dialogue with and Russian overtures 
toward Pakistan are awakening Pakistan to the destabilizing impact their policies are 
having.  Zamir Akram, minister and deputy chief of mission at the Pakistani embassy in 
Washington D.C., has said, The Taliban is now a hurdle in Pakistans relationship with 
the United States.  Furthermore, the situation in Afghanistan prevents Pakistan from 
enjoying an important economic relationship with Central Asia.55  Akram followed by 
stating that much of the perceived Islamic threat in Central Asia is due to a number of 
governments attempting to exercise influence in the region.  
Even if the Taliban does not pose a significant religious threat, it does pose an 
even greater threat in tolerating the pervasive drug trafficking in Central Asia.  The 
United Nations organization claims that Afghanistan produces nearly 75% of the worlds 
opium.56  Pino Arlacchi, UN Under-Secretary General notes that the spread of drugs 
                                                 
54 The Hindu (India), distributed by the Financial Times, London, 28 April 2000 
55 The Times of India, 19 February 2001. 
56 The Afghanistan government has recently implemented regulatory policies 
designed to stem the production of opium.  However, as of the completion date of this 
theis, June 2001, there exist no measurable results of these policies. 
 45
from Afghanistan and other types of criminal and terrorist actions give rise to great 
difficulties for the region (Central Asia).57  The drug trade in Central Asia in terms of 
dollar value is now greater than that of the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia.  One-third 
of the Tajik gross domestic product is drug related.  The illegal drug industry now 
implicates Central Asian government officials, diplomats, and Russian units that patrol 
the border regions.58 
One argument against the Islamic threat is the Talibans survivability.  Professor 
Peter Tomsen stated before a Senate Foreign Relations committee in July 2000, There 
are reasons for hope.  The Taliban is in decline.  It will probably be driven from Kabul by 
the end of this year.59  To the contrary, Russian claims that the Taliban is actually 
increasing in strength, is supported by fact that the larger regions in Afghanistan are now 
controlled by the Taliban, including those bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
The Islamic threat to Central Asia is real.  One can question the level of the threat 
and its ability to gain a long-term foothold in government institutions. However, this 
analysis suggests that at a minimum the presence of the Taliban to the south is providing 
an opportunity for other illegal activity that can be even more devastating to Central 
Asias weak economic and political environment. 
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C.  CHINA 
China has had long standing territorial claims in Central Asia since.  During the 
Sino-Soviet conflict, Chinese maps showed parts of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Kazakhstan within the border of China.  In the 1950s, China accepted a number of 
humiliating geopolitical compromises with the Soviet Union, by surrendering territory 
and complete sovereignty over its own provinces, including the prohibition of foreign 
investment in Xinjiang.60  China continually viewed Central Asia under Soviet rule as a 
relatively stable region.  The Soviets could quell any religious discontent that had the 
potential to spill over into neighboring Chinese regions.   
In the 1980s as the Soviet Union began to collapse, Chinese fears of instability led 
them to move quickly to suppress separatism in the neighboring Xinjiang province, 
deploying more than 200,000 troops.  China has continued to use the potential Islamic 
threat of Central Asia and the ongoing support by Pakistan and Afghanistan of Islamic 
separatists as a reason to maintain a large troop presence in Xinjiang.   
The vast energy resources of the region are extremely important to China, 
particularly since it just recently became a net importer of oil.  The China National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) has made significant inroads toward obtaining the rights to 
some of Kazakhstans richest oilfields, to include the Aktyubinnsk field.    
One result is that Kazakhstan finds itself as a buffer between competing Chinese 
and Russian interests.  Shanghai is Kazakhstans most used port and the Chinese have 
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been quick to gain concessions from Kazakhstan and other neighboring Central Asian 
states in cracking down on Islamic separatists transiting the borders.    
Uncertainties fill Russian-Chinese relations within an ever-changing security 
environment.  Vladimir Putin and President Jiang Zemin met in July 2000.  They were 
quick to accuse the United States of seeking unilateral military and security advantages 
throughout the world.  They also issued a Beijing Declaration, in which each country 
pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of other, a reference to both countries 
concerns over international feelings on Chechnya and separatist movements in China.61 
For the short term, Russia and China have common interests in reducing Islamic 
separatists and nationalist movements in Central Asia.   These good relations are very 
likely to return to confrontation, especially in the economic sphere.  China in the near 
future will replace Russia as the main supplier of light-industrial goods in the region.  
Moreover, the potential for greater economic cooperation between neighboring Chinese 
provinces and Central Asia is growing.62 
Russian-Chinese mutual security objectives can be the most damaging to stability 
in the region.  As noted earlier, the potential for democratic reform in Central Asia has 
declined.  Stephen Blank, testifying before the United States Congress, noted that Russia 
and China have used external threats to justify repressing reform elements within their 
own countries.  A new state with personalistic leadership will see in Russia and China a 
model for controlling domestic opposition.  Fears of an Asian Serbia allow Russia and 
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China to question Western intentions in other regions experiencing economic and 
political instability.63 
For China, the need to keep in line domestic challenges is even more apparent in 
the Xinjiang province.  The current regime in power in China requires strong Peoples 
Liberation Army support to retain its power.64  As stated earlier the strong presence of 
the PLA in Xinjiang could elevate security concerns in Chinese relations with 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in particular, increasing Chinas demands for Central Asian 
concessions on controlling support for ethnic separatists in China. 
A Russian overture toward China to respond to NATO enlargement ignores 
historical reality.  Only 10 years ago, many in the Russian government were pointing out 
that Beijing supported the pro-communist coup detat in Moscow in August 1991 and 
that China has since been either opposed or showed little support for democratization and 
reform in Russia.  It has even led some liberals like Peter Kapitza to note their distrust of 
Chinese intentions.  Dont worry about the NATO expansion, in the near future the 
NATO zone will become our rear in an unprecedented confrontation with the Chinese 
giant.65  However, to demonstrate the great fissure between liberal reformers66 and those 
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who promote strengthening ties with China, the latter point out that only by joining 
forces Russia and China could withstand the growing pressure from the West in its bid to 
destroy two great powers and civilizations, Russian and Chinese.67 
If China continues to have problems with separatist movements in its outlying 
provinces, it may not hesitate to conduct incursions into neighboring countries.  The 
Chinese have also proven that emigration into neighboring regions, as in the Russian Far 
East, can increase Chinese influence and economic potential. 
One of the few bright spots in Chinese efforts in Central Asia is its participation 
in the  Shanghai Five.   In April 1996 at the Shanghai Five Summit, China signed an 
agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on confidence building 
measures in the border zone.  This agreement provided a basis for continued peace and 
stability between Russian and China and reaffirmed their leadership in Central Asia.68  
Unfortunately, Russia and China are using this group as a pulpit more to castigate U.S. 
and Western policies than to promote real security cooperation.  The three countries of 
Central Asia simply find themselves more as backbenchers in agreements that the two 
great powers dominate.  
Nathan and Ross identify one reason for Chinas inability to promote sustainable 
multi-lateral cooperative efforts: 
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Some of Chinas conflicts with Western nations have been exacerbated by 
the central governments inability to enforce international commitments 
on local authorities.  Weak Chinese leadership and institutions will 
continue to plague international cooperation on a wide range of issues.69 
 
As a net importer of energy, China s economic role in Central Asia will increase, 
as Central Asias need for investment and trade far surpasses Russias ability to furnish 
the resources70 required to further develop the region.  For Central Asia, Chinas weak 
domestic institutions and troubles with separatist regions like Xinjiang make Chinas role 
uncertain.  Chinas attempts to maintain the status quo could further stunt Central Asias 
economic reform and development.  China may exploit the current Sino-Russian to 
gradually wean Central Asia from Russian dependence toward a policy even more 
isolated from the West.  The Chinese requirement to maintain the status quo in Central 
Asia so that it can concentrate its resources on its own economic development and 
political consolidation provide an unreliable long-term solution for Central Asia.  
D.  IRAN 
Chapter I of this thesis argued that the lack of common history in Central Asia is a 
central in assessing the potential for stability in the region.  A counter-argument to this 
thesis is that Persian and Turkic traditions go back in Central Asia for over a millennium.  
Russian, European expansion in the 18th Century repressed it.  This tradition at its peak 
reached an area stretching from Anatolia to southern India, from Iraq to Xinjiang.71  
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This historical linkage between Iran and Central Asia was acknowledged by 
Kazakhstans Minister of Culture Yerkegeliy Rahkmadiyev in 1993 when he stated: We 
consider Iran as our home.72   
However, Chapter I pointed out is that the history of Central Asia is not so easily 
defined.  Iranian officials bristle at the mention that Turkic tradition may be more 
prevalent in Central Asia.  Irans deputy foreign minister, when confronted with the 
possibility that Iranian interests in Central Asia may clash with Turkic aspiration, asked, 
What rivalry?  Turks have nothing in the area but local idioms close to Turkish.  
History, civilization, culture, literature, scienceeverything is Iranian.73  This debate 
further illustrates how the use of ill defined cultural traditions help to legitimize the 
presence of other regional powers. 
Iran has vital interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Central Asian 
region.  Its policy has been cautious, primarily strengthening its ties through bilateral 
accords on pipelines (with Turkmenistan) and the construction of communications 
infrastructure.74 
For Russia, the relationship with Iran has an added bonus.  Iran among the 
countries bordering Afghanistan that see the Taliban more as a threat than a promoter of 
Islamic revival in the region.  While the potential for Russian cooperation with Iran in 
direct military intervention in Afghanistan is unlikely, it does provide a potential addition 
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to the anti-Taliban front.  This in turn could potentially lessen Russias military 
responsibilities in Tajikistan. 
On 15 March 2001, Russian President Putin and Iranian President Mohammad 
Khatami met to discuss potential Russian-Iranian cooperation regarding energy pipelines 
in the region.  They both stated their opposition to the U.S.-backed plans to create lines 
whose purpose is to deny Iranian and Russian participation.75 
As it seems with all relations in Central Asia, the positive elements of cultural ties 
and anti-Taliban feelings are countered by Irans proclivity to export its ideology 
elsewhere along the Russian periphery.  In addition, its potentially damaging record on 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its potential to act militarily in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia provide a greater threat to stability in Central Asia and 
Russia.76 
It is these last elements of Irans role in Central Asia that reduce Irans potential 
to play a positive role in creating long term stability in the region.  Steven Sestanovich, 
the former United States Ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the Secretary of 
State for the newly independent states, believed that the Central Asian countries fear an 
expansion of Iranian influence and the rise of violent extremism in their countries.77  
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Further clarifying the point, he added that Iranian position in Central Asia is anything but 
stabilizing. 
E.  TURKEY 
This thesis addresses the debate concerning Turkeys historical linkages with 
Central Asia.  The result is a relationship significantly weakened by stronger economic 
and geopolitical factors.  While Russia continues to view Turkey as one of its strongest 
competitors in the region, Russias history of competing with Turkey and its analysis that 
Turkeys membership in NATO provides additional advantage in Central Asia exaggerate 
Turkeys position in the region. 
Turkeys most pronounced influence along the periphery of Russia is in the 
Caucasus, where its relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, in particular, conflict with 
Russias interests in the region.  Turkeys aspirations in the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline effort 
run counter to Russias CPC efforts.  These challenges in Russian-Turkic relations 
provide little hope for cooperation in Central Asia.   
Turkey continues to press for closer relations with the nations of Central Asia.  
Domestic pressures on the Turkish government of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer are 
pushing the regime to reach out to the east, particularly in light of luke-warm acceptance 
in Europes developing economic institutions.  Ankara has continued to warn the Central 
Asian governments against the danger of continuing their economic dependence on 
Russia.  Turkey viewed Turkmenistans agreement to sell 50 billion cubic meters of 
natural gas to Russia as seriously damaging Turkeys credibility in the region.  The 
Turkmeni-Russian agreement led one leading former Turkish government official to 
state: 
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Turkey, which was deemed a leader in the early 1990s, has now turned out 
to be just another country in the region.  While we started energy projects 
as transporter and investor, we ended as just being an ordinary market.78  
 
This agreement also accelerated a visit by President Sezer to Central Asia to 
improve relations and re-energize Turkish energy projects.  The result was increased 
military assistance to Kyrgyzstan to fight Islamic separatists and the Central Asian 
nations supporting a summit of Turkic-language states in 2001. 
The economic challenges Turkey faces today have been developing over the 
course of the past decade.  Table 3 and table 4 show a gradual decline in Turkeys 
economic potential to the point that in 1999 Turkey fell to a level of negative growth.  
Russia, following the economic collapse of 1998, rebounded in 1999 to post strong 
growth figures.  The economic sphere poses the greatest challenge for Turkeys position 
in Central Asia and limits its capability far below Russian estimates.   
Table 3.  Country Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices 
Country 1995 1998 1999
China 700.2 946.3 989.5
Iran 87.4 112.8 110.8
Pakistan 61.2 62.2 58.2
Russia 337.9 277.8 401.4
Turkey 170.0 201.2 185.7
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Table 4.  Country Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate79 
Country 1995 1998 1999
China 10.5 7.8 7.1
Iran 2.9 2.2 2.5
Pakistan 5.1 2.5 4.0
Russia -4.1 -4.9 3.2
Turkey 7.3 3.1 -5.1
 
F.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that if a new great game is afoot in Central Asia, 
the options for stability other than through Russias involvement are negligible.  The 
competition between Turkey and Iran to define a historical rationale for their presence 
ignores the small political and economic potential each has in the region.  With 
economics playing the lead role in achieving stability in the region, Turkic and/or Iranian 
leadership in the region could only further destabilize the economic potential and result in 
greater political instability, opening the door for more fundamentalist threats. 
The competition among neighboring powers to secure access to Central Asias 
energy sources only reduces the potential for real security cooperation.  The push to 
strengthen bilateral negotiations for energy rights does not promote multilateral 
cooperation.  Energy is an economic plus in the short term, but in the long term, it may be 
a significant factor in deterring the development of multi-lateral security cooperation in 
the region. 
With weakening Western influence, Russian economic troubles, and crumbling 
economies, the countries of Central Asia could turn to Iran, China or even the Taliban for 
assistance.  The consequences of these strengthening relations are hard to fathom, but it is 
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clear that it can only lessen the influence of Western policies in the region.  With 
Russias economy potentially on the rise, it provides a far better alternative for the West 
and a more predictable future for Central Asia.  
By failing to develop alternative options for cooperation with Russia, the United 
States and the West have only helped bring Russia and China closer together in 
perpetuating the status quo in Central Asia.   
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has argued that stability in Central Asia has made little progress since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The instinct to compete in a new great game has 
lessened cooperation and only increased distrust among the regional players.  U.S. policy 
is no exception as it has focused more on isolating Russia than promoting regional multi-
lateral cooperation. 
Democracys failures to take hold in Central Asia and the increasing influence of 
Iran, Pakistan and China have reduced the potential for a real NATO presence in Central 
Asia.  Russias debilitated economy and changing foreign policy doctrine continue to 
reduce CIS influence in the region.  Other attempts at incorporating Central Asia into a 
multi-lateral framework, as in the case of the Shanghai Five, provide forums more for 
exploitation of Central Asia than stability. 
Creating a multi-lateral security framework in Central Asia that incorporates all 
five Central Asian countries as well as Russia, China, Iran, Europe, the United States, the 
countries of South Asia and even other Asian countries is not possible if the countries of 
Central Asia have no shared purpose for doing so.  This thesis has shown that a soft 
history, Russias dominating presence, the failure of Western reform policies and 
neighbors with questionable intentions further prevent Central Asia from locating a basis 
for multi-lateral security cooperation.  With so many competing interests in the region, 
short and long-term stability is in serious jeopardy.   
Democracys short-term failure requires that the West look for alternative policies 
that promote sound economic and political programs that encourage reform but accept the 
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fact that the regimes in power will probably remain so for some time to come.  If the 
West cannot do so, the countries of Central Asia must look to more stable partners that 
can provide potential for economic growth, while guaranteeing internal stability.  This 
thesis argues that Russia is now the best alternative.  Institutional reform cannot take 
place without a stable economy in place.  The economic necessity to retain the current 
relationship with Russia may be at this time the only way to achieve economic stability. 
United States policy makers should not ignore Russias heavy handedness and 
antagonistic tendencies.  Yet, in Central Asia, the best solution is a united U.S.-Russian 
policy that maximizes the most affordable and economically sound energy exploration 
and transportation policies while incorporating programs that build domestic institutions 
that support political and economic reform.  Policies built on cooperation that emphasize 
long-term stability will help China and other regional powers feel less threatened in the 
region. 
Unfortunately for Central Asia, the United States does not have a specific policy 
in Central Asia.  As Stephen Blank notes, U.S. defense policy needs to address the 
region.  For now U.S. Central Command lacks an adequate engagement strategy for 
Central Asia, which comes a poor third after the Middle East and the Gulf in its official 
statements. 80  This paper does not argue that Central Asia should be a priority on any 
countrys overall national security strategy.  However, it does demonstrate that no policy 
                                                 
80 Stephen J. Blank, U.S. Military Engagement with Tanscaucasia and Central 
Asia (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), p. 32 
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or policies that exclude others without working to build multi-lateral cooperation will 
create a vacuum that fierce competition that works to no ones advantage may fill. 
Central Asia can be the third, fourth or fifth priority on a countrys list, yet it 
needs to be a policy not dependent on higher priorities.  Central Asian policy must be 
taken in its own context and promote participation of all the countries along its borders.  
Most of all they must deal with Russia, which by geographic proximity, economic and 
political linkages, and willingness to accept multilateral approaches to Central Asia must 
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